We analyze venture capital (VC) investments in twenty-three non-U.S. countries and compare them to VC investments in the U.S. We describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes. At the same time, however, more experienced VCs implement U.S.-style contracts regardless of legal regime. In most specifications, legal regime becomes insignificant controlling for VC sophistication. VCs who use U.S.-style contracts fail significantly less often. Financial contracting theories in the presence of fixed costs of learning, therefore, appear to explain contracts along a wide range of legal regimes. G24: Investment banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage G32: Financing policy; Capital and ownership structure
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Introduction
Financial contracting plays an important role in aligning incentives and mitigating agency conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs, thus allowing new ventures to obtain financing. 1 Studies of U.S. venture capital (VC) investing, such as Sahlman (1990) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003 and 2004) , show that investor contracts carefully allocate cash flow rights, liquidation rights, and control rights between the entrepreneur and the VC investor in order to mitigate agency conflicts. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003 and 2004) also show that the characteristics of U.S. VC contracts correspond well to the (optimal) contracts predicted by financial contracting theories.
At the same time, the large and growing literature in law and finance finds that legal and institutional differences among countries appear to be important for the development and nature of financial markets, and also for economic growth.
2 The ability to design investments and financial contracts is potentially dependent on various elements of the institutional environment -the nature of corporate and contract law, the quality of legal enforcement, accounting systems, tax regulations, financial markets, etc. If the institutional environment affects the types of contracts that can be written, this could change the types of contracts that are optimal.
This raises the question of whether the financial contracts observed in the U.S. are optimal in other institutional environments. Theories of financial contracting would suggest yes (because they assume property rights are enforced and little else). Alternatively, sufficiently great institutional differences might lead to a negative answer. In this paper, we address this question by studying VC investments across different institutional environments -145 investments in 107 companies in 23 countries by 70 different lead VCs. The sample companies are concentrated in Western European countries and other relatively "developed" countries.
First, we describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, the contracts differ significantly across legal regimes.
While convertible preferred is the most commonly used security, it is used much less frequently outside the U.S. than in the U.S. Partly as a result, VCs investing outside the U.S. deals have weaker liquidation and exit rights. Non-U.S. investments also are less likely to use contingencies -including milestones, vesting provisions and anti-dilution rights -resulting in less high-powered cash flow incentives compared to their US counterparts.
Next, we consider how the contracts vary across legal regimes. We find that the contracts vary systematically across those regimes. In particular, investments in common law countries are more likely to look like U.S. contracts while investments elsewhere are likely to differ. Liquidation preferences, anti-dilution protections, vesting provisions and redemption rights are more typical in common law countries while milestones are less common. These results are similar to those found in Lerner and Schoar (2003) who study VC and private equity investments in developing countries.
Although contractual differences correlate with the institutional environment, they cannot fully explain these differences. For example, investors can implement seniority clauses, antidilution protection, redemption rights and vesting in non-common law countries like Germany, France, and Sweden. In fact, we find that some VC funds implement U.S. contractual features in those countries and across all the institutional environments in which they invest. In univariate analyses, as VC size, VC age, and VC experience with U.S. VCs increase, VCs are more likely to implement U.S. style contractual terms. This suggests that while it may not be easy or obvious how to adapt contracts, with enough effort (or legal fees), VCs can replicate most U.S.-style contracts.
This leads us to compare the importance of legal regime versus learning and experience.
We estimate the determinants of contracts using regressions that include both legal variables and measures of VC "sophistication." We find that U.S.-style contracts are more likely when the lead VC has previously syndicated with U.S. VCs, when the lead VC is from the U.S., and when the VC is larger and older. In the presence of the VC sophistication variables, institutional differences are relatively less important. The legal variables are not significant in most specifications.
The results on VC sophistication suggest that the U.S. model and U.S. contracts may be optimal outside the U.S. We explore this possibility by studying the survival of the 70 VCs represented as lead investors in our sample. As of August 2003, 59 of the 70 are still active while 11 have not survived. We then separate the VC funds depending on the securities they used when acting as lead investors. None of the 37 funds that exclusively used convertible preferred (and U.S. style contracts) has failed. In contrast, 34% of the 29 funds that exclusively used common stock (and non-U.S. style contracts) have not survived. Said another way, of the 11 funds that have not survived, all but one never used convertible preferred. While this does not prove causality, the result strongly suggests that better funds use U.S. style contracts.
Overall, then, we interpret our results as being most consistent with an explanation in which financial contracting theories in the presence of fixed costs of learning appear to explain contracts along a wide range of legal regimes. Based on this, we would predict more convergence in contracts over time.
Ours is not the first paper to study VC contracts outside of the U.S. In contrast to earlier studies, but similar to ours, contemporaneous work by Lerner and Schoar (2003) uses actual contracts in private equity investments in developing countries. We view their sample and paper as an interesting complement to ours. They find similar results in that contracts are significantly related to legal origin. While they do not focus on the sophistication and learning effects that we consider, their results on legal origin are robust to including a dummy variable for U.S. or U.K. based organization. There are at least three possible explanations for the different result. First, legal differences may be more of a constraint in developing countries (although we do not find such a result in the few developing country investments in our sample). Second, they study primarily private equity investments in more mature businesses rather than VC investments. It may be more difficult to contract around existing assets. Finally, their sample may include investors with government ties who may have different incentives from the investors we study. In our conclusion, we discuss how the findings of a recent paper by Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) are potentially helpful in reconciling our results with those in Lerner and Schoar (2003) .
Our paper also complements earlier work on global venture capital activity. In a crosscountry study, Jeng and Wells (2000) show that factors such as IPO activity, government policies toward start-ups, and labor market rigidities help explain differences in aggregate venture capital activity between countries. Similarly, Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh (2001) argue that country differences in the composition of investors who provide funds to VC firms (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, private corporations) result in different VC portfolio characteristics across countries with respect to stage, geography, and industry focus.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the sample. In section 3, we present our univariate analyses of the sample contracts and consider the (univariate) relation of those contracts to legal and institutional factors, as well as VC characteristics. In section 4, we present our multivariate results. In section 5, we relate the contractual terms to VC survival. In section 6, we conclude.
Sample
Description
We analyze 145 investments in 107 companies in 23 countries by 70 different lead VCs.
We obtained the investments from two sources -directly from VCs whom we know who invest outside the U.S. and indirectly with the help of a limited partner (institutional investor) who invests in non-U.S. VC partnerships. All of the VC partnerships were for profit, nongovernmental entities. Palomino, and Schwienbacher (2003) for Europe.
For each company and for each financing round for the company, we asked the VC to provide the (1) term sheet; (2) stock and security purchase agreements; (3) company's business plan; and (4) the VC's internal analysis of the investment. The amount of information we obtained differs across investments and the different VCs who provided info. investments that is roughly two years older.
Panel C presents the industry distribution of the portfolio companies in our sample. The greatest percentage of companies, 58%, is in software and internet. Just over 10% of the companies are in each of hardware, telecommunications, and life sciences.
Panel D provides additional information about the investments. We have the first VC round for 89% of the companies and roughly 2/3 of the investments are early stage, meaning that the companies are quite young and have a limited operating history. Finally, the average investment is between $6 and $7 million with a median of just over $3 million.
Sample selection issues
In this section, we discuss potential selection issues concerning our sample. Our companies and financings are not a random sample in that we obtained the data from VC firms with whom we have a direct or indirect relationship.
It is possible that we have a bias toward the more successful investments of a particular The more serious potential bias is that we have selected the VC firms. It is possible that the average VC in our sample is different from the average VC in any of the countries we study.
If this is so, then our sample averages may be inaccurate. However, there is, again, no reason to believe that our results regarding cross-sectional differences across legal regimes and types of VCs are biased in any way.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the sample is selected and it is difficult to know the extent of any bias. We have discussed the more likely biases and do not believe there are any obvious red flags.
Contract characteristics: Univariate analyses
In this section, we present univariate analyses of the sample contracts and consider the (univariate) relation of those contracts to legal and institutional factors, as well as VC characteristics.
Non-U.S. versus U.S. financings
The first two columns of Overall, then, the first two columns of table 2 suggest the VC contracts outside the U.S.
have weaker rights of all types than those in the U.S.
Relation to legal origin
There is a large recent literature that studies how differences in legal origins and institutions affect various aspects of financial market activity across countries. The legal system may affect the design of financial contracts in such a way that certain contractual provisions may be infeasible or more costly to enforce. In addition, the contracts may need to incorporate new protective mechanisms to make up for the legal deficiencies.
We now consider how the non-U.S. contracts in our sample vary with the legal origin of the country in which the portfolio company is located. The last five columns of table 2 classify the non-U.S. contracts in our sample into one of five different legal regimes -common law, civil law, German law, Scandinavian law, and communist background. Except for communist background with only five contracts, we have at least 26 contracts in the other four legal regimes.
In our discussion, we generally will not refer to the results for the communist background countries because of the small number of observations. Table 2 shows that for most provisions, common law country contracts tend to be closer to U.S.-style than the contracts in countries with other legal origins. Common law country deals tend to make greater use of convertible preferred while Scandinavian law country deals tend to make the least use of such securities. Common law country contracts (1) include more anti-dilution protection; (2) make greater use of vesting provisions; (3) are more likely to have a liquidation preference at least equal to the amount invested; (4) are more likely to have some type of exit mechanism; and (5) are the least likely to keep the founder in control of the board.
The one exception is that the common law country deals are the least likely to use milestones.
Overall, these results suggest that legal origins / legal regimes affect the nature and types of contracts that are written. This is consistent with the evidence in the LaPorta et al. papers that countries differ in their corporate law and in the ability to write and enforce contracts
Relation to legal, tax, and accounting institutions
The results in the previous section indicate that legal origins matter for contracts, but do not indicate why. In this section, we consider whether seven specific measures of differences in legal rules, tax rules, accounting rules, and market institutions drive those results.
First, we consider the "rule of law" index used by LaPorta et al. (1997) . The index is a measure of the quality of a country's legal and enforcement system. 7 The first column of table 3 indicates that U.S. style contracts are negatively correlated with the rule of law measure.
Convertible preferred, anti-dilution rights, liquidation preference, and exit provision are more common in countries with low rule of law. One might interpret this result as showing that U.S.
style contracts are more appropriate when rule of law is low. There are two problems with this interpretation. First, the U.S. has the highest rule of law. Second, the results are largely driven by the fact that non-U.S. contracts are more typical in Scandinavian countries that have a high rule of law.
Apart from the legal system, corporate governance also may be affected by a country's accounting system (see Bushman and Smith (2001) ). This is likely to be particularly true in the case of contingencies or milestones that are use accounting-based performance measures. Under a less reliable accounting system, such milestones might be less feasible, leading to fewer contingencies. In the second column of table 3, we consider how the contracts in our sample vary with the accounting standards of the company's country, using the measure of accounting standards from LaPorta et al. (1997) . The column indicates that the contracts are qualitatively identical across countries with strong and poor accounting standards.
Third, contracts may be affected by the strength of a country's bankruptcy laws and creditor protection. In particular, one might expect creditor protection to have an effect on liquidation rights. We use the index of creditor protection calculated in LaPorta et al. (1997) .
Column 3 of table 3 indicates that contracts in high creditor protection countries have greater liquidation rights and make greater use of exit provisions. Again, this result is somewhat difficult to interpret as U.S. contracts have strong liquidation rights, but the U.S. has the lowest creditor protection score.
Next, we consider differences in minority shareholder protection. To the extent that minority shareholders are not protected, it may be more important for the VCs to get explicit control rights. We use the index of shareholder protection calculated in LaPorta et al. (1997) .
Column four of table 3 indicates that there are no substantive differences across low and high minority protection countries.
Fifth, we consider restrictions on the ability of corporations to buy back their own shares. 7 We assume that this measure (and other various measures we use), calculated in LaPorta et al. (1997) , are still valid for our slightly later sample period.
Such restrictions are potentially important in that they might make it more difficult to implement redemption and vesting provisions that typically require the company to repurchase shares. We distinguish between countries in which companies can or cannot repurchase more than ten percent of their shares (See Sabri (2002)). Column five of table 3 indicates that differences in repurchase rules are unrelated to the contract provisions in our sample.
Sixth, we consider the tax environment that firms face. One area where taxation differences might play an important role in contract design is the tax treatment of equity-based compensation (including employee stock options). The European Venture Capital Association (see EVCA (2001)) argues that the heavy taxation of stock option grants in Europe hampers the ability of investors to provide incentives to portfolio company management. The EVCA's lobbying activity has recently led several countries to change their tax rules for employee stock options to more closely resemble the U.S. treatment.
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We distinguish between countries with favorable and unfavorable taxation of stock options. We code as unfavorable those tax regimes that tax stock option gains at vesting (rather than at exercise or sale) or tax option gains at marginal tax rates that exceed 40%. We might expect to see less incentive compensation and less use of vesting in countries with unfavorable taxation. Column six of table 3 indicates that the only significant difference across favorable and unfavorable tax regimes is the use of anti-dilution provisions that are not particularly related to tax. Vesting provisions are more common in favorable tax regimes, but not significantly so.
Finally, we consider the liquidity of the stock markets in the portfolio company countries.
Black and Gilson (1998) argue that an active venture capital market relies heavily on the VCs' ability to exit their portfolio investments through a public offering. In support of this argument, Jeng and Wells (2000) find that VC investing is higher in countries with greater numbers and values of initial public offerings of stock (IPOs). We distinguish IPO activity by whether the country had more than thirty IPOs in 1999. 9 We might expect the strength of exit provisions to be related to this measure. In column 7 of table 3, the only significant difference across IPO activity is that ordinary common is more prevalent in countries with high IPO activity.
Overall, then, the direct measures of legal, tax, and accounting institutions that we have explored are not particularly successful in explaining the previous results on the relation of the contracts to legal origin.
Implementation of U.S. style contracts outside the U.S.
The results in the previous section suggest that legal, tax, and institutional differences are unlikely to be the whole story in explaining the distribution of contracts that we observe. In this section, we explain why those results may not be surprising -some VCs manage to implement U.S. style contracts in all of the countries we study. Table 4 summarizes this discussion.
First, even if convertible preferred stock is disfavored in corporate law, it is generally possible to use senior common stock or combinations of common and non-convertible preferred stock or debt to mimic the control and liquidation rights of convertible preferred.
Second, even if the legal regime makes it difficult to impose standard anti-dilution provisions, it is generally possible to mimic those provisions using warrants that are exercisable conditional on a subsequent financing at a lower valuation.
Third, even if vesting and other contingencies are hampered by unfavorable tax laws, it is generally possible to use put options on the entrepreneur's stock that are exercisable by the VC if the entrepreneur leaves or misbehaves. In countries where additional equity for the entrepreneur is taxed as compensation, it is possible to provide contingent equity by making the valuation or financing contingent rather than the entrepreneur's equity stake.
Fourth, it seems unlikely that legal differences could explain the absence of liquidation preference. VCs can use seniority clauses in all of the countries in our sample.
Fifth, even if redemption rights are infeasible due to restrictions on a company buying back its own stock, the VC can mimic these rights by combining a senior claim with drag-along rights. This effectively gives the VC the right to liquidate because drag-along rights force all shareholders to sell when the senior claimant decides to sell even if the senior claimant gets all or most of the proceeds.
Sixth, if the local legal, tax, and institutional environment simply gets too restrictive, it is generally possible to reincorporate the company in a country that is less restrictive. As column 3 of table 1 shows, 21% of the companies in our sample do reincorporate in another country.
There is a net flow of companies from countries of German and Scandinavian legal origin to countries of common law origin.
These six examples indicate that while it may not be easy or obvious how to adapt a particular contract, with enough effort and legal expertise, it appears possible to replicate most U.S. style contractual mechanisms elsewhere.
Relation to VC experience and sophistication
The previous section describes how some VCs are able to get around institutional constraints to implement U.S. style contracts. In this section, we examine the characteristics of those VCs who do so. For each financing, we identify the lead VC based on the VC who invests the greatest amount in that financing. The lead VC typically plays the greatest role in negotiating the contract with the entrepreneur.
In our analysis, we attempt to distinguish among the lead VCs by experience and sophistication using three different variables. First, we distinguish between smaller and larger VCs, using a breakpoint of (the sample median of) $200 million under management. Second, we distinguish between younger and older VC firms, using a breakpoint of (the sample median age of) four years. Third, we classify VCs according to their familiarity with the U.S. 37 financings were led by VCs based in the U.S.; 87 financings were led by VCs who had previously syndicated (or invested) with U.S. VCs; and 37 financings were led by VCs with no U.S.
experience. We determined if the VC had U.S. experience by examining the Venture Economics financing database, the VentureOne financing database, and the individual VC websites. have stronger anti-dilution protection, and are less likely to leave the founder with board control.
It is only in the use of milestones where there are no clear differences across VC experience.
The strong results for VC experience contrast with the much weaker results for legal, tax, and accounting institutions. The univariate results, therefore, seem particularly consistent with the importance of learning. The multivariate analysis in section 4 will allow us to test this.
Relation to financing round characteristics
It also is possible that the contractual characteristics vary with other characteristics of the financing round. Accordingly, our final univariate analysis considers how contractual characteristics vary with the size of the investment, whether the investment is the first by a VC, and the age of the portfolio company.
Column 1 of 
Multivariate results
At this point, we have found that VC contracts are highly related to a country's legal origin and measures of VC experience or sophistication. The contracts also are somewhat related to deal characteristics and legal, accounting and institutional features. In this section, we assess the relative importance of these different variables using multiple regression analyses.
We use seven different contract characteristics as dependent variables: (i) whether the round uses convertible or participating preferred; (ii) whether the round uses founder vesting;
(iii) whether the round uses milestones; (iv) whether the round uses anti-dilution protection; (v) whether the liquidation preference is less than, equal to, or greater than the amount invested; (vi) whether the round uses redemption rights; and (vii) whether the founder has control, shares control, or does not have control of the board.
Most of the regressions measure legal origin as a dummy variable equal to one if the portfolio company is in a country with a common law legal origin. We also estimate some regressions using the indices for accounting standards, creditor protection, minority protection, and the dummy for option taxation. The reported regressions do not include share repurchase restrictions or IPO activity. When these variables are included, they are never significant.
The regressions measure VC sophistication using a dummy variable equal to one if the lead VC is U.S.-based, a dummy variable equal to one if the lead VC is not U.S.-based, but has previously syndicated with U.S. VCs, and a variable equal to the age (in years) of the VC firm at the time of the financing.
All of the regressions control for whether the round is the first VC round and portfolio company age. They do not control for round size because that is arguably endogenous with the contracts. The results are qualitatively similar when we control for round size. When the regressions control for industry and year effects, we include four dummy variables for industry (software and Internet, hardware, telecom, and life science) and four for year (1998 to 2001) .
In panel A of table 7, we estimate the regressions with the common law dummy and the VC sophistication variables. These regressions do not control for industry and year effects. The regressions strongly suggest that VC sophistication swamps the effect of legal origin. The common law dummy is significant only for the use of anti-dilution provisions. In contrast, at least one of the VC sophistication variables is significant in all seven specifications. U.S. style contracts are significantly more likely with U.S.-based VCs for all of the specifications except for the use of milestones. U.S. style contracts also are significantly more likely for VCs who have syndicated with U.S. VCs in all of the specifications except the one using vesting. In addition, the use of convertible preferred, anti-dilution protection, and liquidation preferences all increase with VC age.
Panel B of table 7 estimates the same regressions as in panel A, but controls for industry and year effects. The common law origin variable is now significant in two of the regressions.
Convertible preferred and anti-dilution rights are more likely in countries of common law origin.
Again, however, at least one measure of VC sophistication is significant in all seven specifications. With minor exceptions, the coefficients and significance levels are unchanged.
Panel C of table 7 replaces the common law origin dummy with the more detailed accounting, legal, and tax variables, but, again, controls for industry and year. We lose some observations because we do not have the relevant indices for all of the countries in our sample. Overall, then, the results in table 7 indicate that the VC sophistication variables consistently have significant explanatory power while the legal and institutional variables do not.
The relation of contractual terms to VC survival.
The analysis so far suggests that the most sophisticated and experienced VCs are able to implement U.S. style contracts across many different legal regimes. One interpretation of this result is that U.S. style contracts are optimal or, at least, the most effective of available contracts.
This interpretation is consistent with Kaplan and Schoar (2003) who find that more experienced VCs outperform less experienced VCs. Another interpretation, however, might be that VCs use the contracts with which they are familiar. Because the more sophisticated and experienced
VCs are more familiar with U.S. contracts, they use them regardless of whether they are optimal.
In this section, we attempt to distinguish between those two interpretations by looking at the ex post performance of the lead VCs in our sample. If the first interpretation is accurate, then the VCs who use U.S. style contracts should be more successful than those who do not. Under the second interpretation, we would not expect to see a large difference.
There are 70 different lead VCs in the financings in our sample. Although we cannot collect ex post return information on these VCs, we can observe whether the VC firms are still operating entities. We used Venture Economics, VentureOne, and the VC firm websites to determine the current status of the VC firms. Table 8 reports that as of August 2003, 59 of the 70 lead VCs were still active and independent while 11 had failed or had been acquired.
We then classify VCs according to whether they always used, sometimes used, or never used convertible or participating preferred stock. We take the use of such stock as indicative of using U.S. style contracts because this is true of virtually all the U.S. financings in Kaplan and
Strömberg (2003).
The results are striking and highly statistically significant. Of the 29 VCs that never used a preferred stock, 34% (or 10) have not survived. Of the 37 VCs that always used a preferred stock, none has failed. The four VCs who sometimes used a preferred stock fall in between with one of the four having not survived. Said another way, ten of the eleven VCs that have failed to survive never used a preferred stock.
The other two panels of the table separate VCs based in common law countries from VCs based in non-common law countries. The outcomes for VCs in non-common law countries drive the results. Still, the one failed VC firm in a common law country was one that never used a preferred stock.
Overall, then, while the survival and failure results do not prove causation, it is clear that the more successful VCs use convertible or participating preferred rather than common stock.
Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we have compared VC contracts in twenty-three other countries to those in the U.S. We have analyzed how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, we find that contracts differ across legal regimes. In particular, U.S. style contracts are more typical in common law countries. However, there appear to be few institutional impediments against implementing U.S.-style terms. We find that more experienced and sophisticated VCs are able to implement U.S. One caveat to this prediction is that our results are based on start-ups largely in developed countries. There are two forces that may favor convergence for these types of firms. First, enforcement of laws is generally not a major problem in most of the countries we study.
Second, it may be easier to write desirable contracts for new businesses than for existing ones.
The somewhat different results in Lerner and Schoar (2003) for private equity investments in developing countries suggest that either or both of these forces may be quite important.
In fact, our results in conjunction with those of Lerner and Schoar (2003) "individuals can structure contracts to reduce the adverse effects from contracting institutions ... Because of these adjustments, the usual effect of rules governing contracts on investment and growth may be relatively limited; exceptions occur only when contracting institutions are extremely bad. In contrast, because enforceable contracts between the state and individuals are not possible, property rights institutions constraining arbitrary behavior and expropriation by the state and elites controlling the state have more important effects on economic outcomes."
Our results suggest that sophisticated investors contract around existing contracting institutions to implement similar (optimal) contracts for (i) start-ups located in countries in which property rights are enforced; and (ii) for start-ups in developing countries with poor property right enforcement that are able to reincorporate in countries in which property rights are enforced. It may be more difficult for more mature companies in developing countries to incorporate elsewhere. . 'Rule of law, High' refers to the sub-sample of investments with a 'Rule of law' index of 10. 'Accounting standards, High' refers to the sub-sample of investments with an 'Accounting standards' index of 69 or higher. 'Creditor protection, High' refers to the sub-sample of investments with a 'Creditor protection' index of 3 or higher. 'Minority protection, High' refers to the subsample of investments with a 'Minority protection' index of 3 or higher. 'Favorable options tax' refers to the sub-sample of investments in countries where there is no tax on employee stock options upon exercise. 'Share repos unrestricted' refers to the sub-sample of investments in countries where corporations are allowed to buy back more than 10% of their shares. 'Per cap. VC invest.' refers to the sub-sample of investments in countries with VC investment in 1999 above $41 per capita. 'IPO activity, High' refers to the sub-sample of investments in countries with more than 30 IPO's per year on average 1999-2000. Contractual provisions are significantly different across sub-samples at the: 1% ***; 5% **, and 10% * levels. Tests for degree of liquidation preference and degree of board control are joint across the three degrees of liquidation preference / board control, using a Kruskal-Wallis test. All other tests refer to differences in means tests, using a rank-sum test. Anti-dilution warrants: Warrants attached to the VC's stock can be exercised by an investor in case of a capital increase or in case of an issuance of stock to finance the acquisition of another company, given that the price per share involved is below the original subscription price. The number of shares to be acquired this way will be such that the resulting price obtained by the investors after these transactions is equal to the original subscription price.
Vesting Provisions: Company will have a repurchase option to buy back at cost a portion of the shares of common stock held by a certain shareholder (founder) if such shareholder's employment with the company ends before some specified date. A portion will be released each month from the repurchase option based upon continued employment.
Purpose: Make it costly for founder to leave firm prematurely. Increase pay-performance sensitivity.
Problem: Vesting of shares may be treated as income, and as a result vested shares are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate upon the vesting date. "Good leaver" and "bad leaver" provisions:
(example) " 'Good leavers' (i.e founder employees voluntarily terminating their employment contract with the company) shall offer their shares in the company to the other shareholders at a price incorporating a considerable penalty. 'Bad leavers' (i.e. founders being terminated as a result of material breach by the founder employees of the applicable terms and conditions of their employment contract with the company) shall offer their shares to the other shareholders of the company at a price corresponding to the valuation of the last financing less 25%. Agreement will terminate upon an IPO or a sale of the company."
Equity milestones: Upon company reaching a performance milestone, additional shares will be issued to founders.
Granting / transferring of shares to founders will be treated as income, and granted shares taxed at the ordinary income tax rate.
Contingent valuations: Upon company reaching a performance milestone, investors will put in additional funds in the company.
Redemption provisions: (example) At the election of the holders of a majority of the preferred, the Company shall redeem the outstanding preferred shares in two equal installments beginning on the fifth anniversary of the prior preferred closing date.
Share repurchases restricted by corporate law.
Drag-along provision: After five years, if investors offer to sell their shares to a 3 rd party, it may require all the other shareholders also to sell or dispose of their shares on a pro rata basis and on the same terms to the 3 rd party. Other exit provision: If listing does not occur in five years, the parties agree that upon request of the majority of investors, the company shall instruct an investment bank to find a buyer for all of the company's shares. Table 7 Multivariate analysis Summary information for 145 investments in 107 portfolio companies from 18 countries by 69 different lead VCs between 1992 and 2001. 'First VC round' is a dummy equal to one if the investment refers to the first round where any VC invested. 'Age of firm' is the age of the portfolio company at the time of the investment, in years. 'Common law' is a dummy equal to one if the portfolio company is located in a country with a common law legal system. 'Lead VC has US experience' is a dummy equal to one if the lead VC has previously invested in a company with US-based VC funds as co-investors. 'VC is based in the US' is a dummy equal to one if the Lead VC investor is located in the United States. 'Non-U.S. VC with U.S. exper' is a dummy equal to one if the Lead VC investor is (1) not located in the United States, and (2) had either previously invested in a portfolio company located in the United States or co-invested with a U.S.-based VC at the time of the financing. 'VC age' is the age of the VC firm in years. 'Accounting standards', 'Creditor protection', and 'Minority protection' ('Anti-director rights') are from LaPorta at al (1997) . 'Option tax favorable' is a dummy taking the value of one if employee and management stock options are not taxed at the point of exercise. Industry effects include dummies for 5 industries: Internet/Software, High-tech/Hardware, Telecom, Medical, Other. Regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% ***; 5% **, and 10% * levels.
Deal VCs always using preferred 37 0 0% VCs sometimes using preferred 4 1 25% VCs never using preferred 29 10 34%
Chi square test (2 df) = 14.87 ***
Non-common law VCs only
All Lead VCs 40 10 30%
VCs using all preferred 14 0 0% VCs sometimes using preferred 3 1 33% VCs never using preferred 23 9 39%
Chi square test (2 df) = 7.23 **
Common law VCs only
All Lead VCs 30 1 3%
VCs using all preferred 23 0 0% VCs sometimes using preferred 1 0 0% VCs never using preferred 6 1 17%
Chi square test (2 df) = 4.14
